Armenia in comments -- Book: Ecclesiastes (tEccles) Ժողովող
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tEccles 9:1 "For all this I brought to my consciousness, and all this I sought to make clear to me, that the righteous, and the wise, and their deeds, are in God's hands: neither love nor hatred stands in the knowledge of man, all lies before them." With ki follows the verification of what is said in Ecc 8:17, "is unable to find out," from the fact of men, even the best and the wisest of men, being on all sides conditioned. This conditioning is a fact which he layeth to his heart (Ecc 7:2), or (since he here presents himself less as a feeling than as a thinking man, and the heart as reflecting) which he has brought to his consciousness, and which he has sought to bring out into clearness. ולבוּל has here not the force of an inf. absol., so that it subordinates itself in an adverbial manner (et ventilando quidem) - for it nowhere stands in the same rank with the inf. absol.; but the inf. with ל (ל) has the force of an intentional (with a tendency) fut., since the governing הייתי, as at Ecc 3:15, היה, and at Hab 1:17, יהיה, is to be supplied (vid., comm. on these passages, and under Isa 44:14): operam dedi ut ventilarem (excuterem), or shorter: ventilaturus fui. Regarding the form לבוּר, which is metapl. for לבר, and the double idea of sifting (particularly winnowing, ventilare) of the R. בר, vid., under Ecc 3:18. In the post-bibl. Heb. the words להעמיד על בוריו would denote the very same as is here expressed by the brief significant word לבוּר; a matter in the clearness of its actual condition is called בוריו דבר על (from לברי, after the form חלי, purity, vid., Buxtorf's Lex. Talm. col. 366). The lxx and Syr. have read ראה ולבי instead of ולבור, apparently because they could not see their way with it: "And my heart has seen all this." The expression "all this" refers both times to what follows; asher is, as at Ecc 8:12, relat. conj., in the sense of ὃτι, quod, and introduces, as at Ecc 7:29, cf. Ecc 8:14, the unfolding of the זה - an unfolding, viz., of the conditioning of man, which Ecc 8:17 declared on one side of it, and whose further verification is here placed in view with ki, Ecc 9:1. The righteous, and the wise, and their doings, are in God's hand, i.e., power (Psa 31:16; Pro 21:1; Job 12:10, etc.); as well their persons as their actions, in respect of their last cause, are conditioned by God, the Governor of the world and the Former of history; also the righteous and the wise learn to feel this dependence, not only in their being and in what befalls them, but also in their conduct; also this is not fully attained, לאל ידם, they are also therein not sufficient of themselves. Regarding 'avadēhěm, corresponding to the Aram. 'ovadēhon, vid., 'avad.
The expression now following cannot mean that man does not know whether he will experience the love or hatred of God, i.e., providences of a happy nature proceeding from the love of God, or of an unhappy nature proceeding from the hatred of God (J. D. Michaelis, Knobel, Vaih., Hengst., Zckl.), for אהבה and שׂן are too general for this, - man is thus, as the expression denotes, not the obj., but the subj. to both. Rightly, Hitz., as also Ewald: "Since man has not his actions in his own power, he knows not whether he will love or hate." Certainly this sounds deterministic; but is it not true that personal sympathies and antipathies, from which love and hatred unfold themselves, come within the sphere of man, not only as to their objects, in consequence of the divine arrangement, but also in themselves anticipate the knowledge and the will of man? and is it less true that the love which he now cherishes toward another man changes itself, without his previous knowledge, by means of unexpected causes, into hatred, and, on the other hand, the hatred into love? Neither love nor hatred is the product of a man's self-determination; but self-determination, and with it the function of freedom, begins for the first time over against those already present, in their beginnings. In הכּל לף, "by all that is before him," that is brought to a general expression, in which לפני has not the ethical meaning proceeding from the local: before them, prae = penes eos (vid., Song, under Sol 8:12), but the purely local meaning, and referred to time: love, hatred, and generally all things, stand before man; God causes them to meet him (cf. the use of הקרה); they belong to the future, which is beyond his power. Thus the Targ., Symm., and most modern interpreters; on the contrary, Luther: "neither the love nor the hatred of any one which he has for himself," which is, linguistically, purely impossible; Kleinert: "Neither the love nor the hatred of things does man see through, nor anything else which is before his eyes," for which we ought at least to have had the words לפניו גם הכל אשׁר; and Tyler: "Men discern neither love nor hatred in all that is before them," as if the text were אשׁר בכל. The future can, it is true, be designated by אחרית, and the past by לפנים, but according to the most natural way of representation (vid., Orelli's Synon. der Zeit, p. 14) the future is that which lies before a man, and the past that which is behind him. The question is of importance, which of the two words לף הכל has the accent. If the accent be on לף, then the meaning is, that all lies before men deprived of their freedom; if the accent be on הכל, then the meaning is, that all things, events of all kinds, lie before them, and that God determines which shall happen to them. The latter is more accordant with the order of words lying before us, and shows itself to be that which is intended by the further progress of the thoughts. Every possible thing may befall a man - what actually meets him is the determination and providence of God. The determination is not according to the moral condition of a man, so that the one can guide to no certain conclusion as to the other. Ecclesiastes 9:2 tEccles 9:4 "For (to him) who shall be always joined to all the living, there is hope: for even a living dog is better than a dead lion." The interrog. אשׁר מי, quis est qui, acquires the force of a relative, quisquis (quicunque), and may be interpreted, Exo 32:33; Sa2 20:12, just as here (cf. the simple mi, Ecc 5:9), in both ways; particularly the latter passage (Sa2 20:11) is also analogous to the one before us in the formation of the apodosis. The Chethı̂b יבחר does not admit of any tenable meaning. In conformity with the usus loq., Elster reads מי אשר יבחר, "who has a choice?" But this rendering has no connection with what follows; the sequence of thoughts fails. Most interpreters, in opposition to the usus loq., by pointing יבחר or יבּחר, render: Who is (more correctly: will be) excepted? or also: Who is it that is to be preferred (the living or the dead)? The verb בּחר signifies to choose, to select; and the choice may be connected with an exception, a preference; but in itself the verb means neither excipere nor praeferre.
(Note: Luther translates, "for to all the living there is that which is desired, namely, hope," as if the text were יבחר מה אשׁר.)
All the old translators, with right, follow the Kerı̂, and the Syr. renders it correctly, word for word: to every one who is joined (שותף, Aram. = Heb. חבר) to all the living there is hope; and this translation is more probable than that on which Symm. ("who shall always continue to live?") and Jerome (nemo est qui semper vivat et qui hujus rei habeat fiduciam) proceed: Who is he that is joined to the whole? i.e., to the absolute life; or as Hitzig: Who is he who would join himself to all the living (like the saying, "The everlasting Jew")? The expression ישׁ בּטּ does not connect itself so easily and directly with these two latter renderings as with that we have adopted, in which, as also in the other two, a different accentuation of the half-verse is to be adopted as follows:
כּי מי אשׁר יחבּר אל־כּל־החיּים ישׁ בּטּחון
The accentuation lying before us in the text, which gives a great disjunctive to יבחר as well as to הח, appears to warrant the Chethı̂b (cf. Hitzig under Eze 22:24), by which it is possible to interpret יב ... מי as in itself an interrog. clause. The Kerı̂ יח does not admit of this, for Dachselt's quis associabit se (sc.,, mortius? = nemo socius mortuorum fieri vult) is a linguistic impossibility; the reflex may be used for the pass., but not the pass. for the reflex., which is also an argument against Ewald's translation: Who is joined to the living has hope. Also the Targ. and Rashi, although explaining according to the Midrash, cannot forbear connecting אל כל־חה with יח, and thus dividing the verse at חה instead of at יח. It is not, however, to be supposed that the accentuation refers to the Chethı̂b; it proceeds on some interpretation, contrary to the connection, such as this: he who is received into God's fellowship has to hope for the full life (in eternity). The true meaning, according to the connection, is this: that whoever (quicunque) is only always joined (whether by birth or the preservation of life) to all the living, i.e., to living beings, be they who they may, has full confidence, hope, and joy; for in respect to a living dog, this is even better than a dead lion. Symmachus translates: κυνὶ ζῶντι βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἤ λέοντι τεθνηκότι, which Rosenm., Herzf., and Grtz approve of. But apart from the obliquity of the comparison, that with a living dog it is better than with a dead lion, since with the latter is neither good nor evil (vid., however, Ecc 6:5), for such a meaning the words ought to have been: chělěv hai tov lo min ha'aryēh hammeth.
As the verifying clause stands before us, it is connected not with ישׁ בּטּ, but with אל כּל־ה, of that which is to be verified; the ל gives emphatic prominence (Ewald, 310b) to the subject, to which the expression refers as at Psa 89:19; Ch2 7:21 (cf. Jer 18:16), Isa 32:1 : A living dog is better than a dead lion, i.e., it is better to be a dog which lives, than that lion which is dead. The dog, which occurs in the Holy Scriptures only in relation to a shepherd's dog (Job 30:1), and as for the rest, appears as a voracious filthy beast, roaming about without a master, is the proverbial emblem of that which is common, or low, or contemptible, Sa1 17:43; cf. "dog's head," Sa2 3:8; "dead dog," Sa1 24:15; Sa2 9:8; Sa2 16:9. The lion, on the other hand, is the king, or, as Agur (Pro 30:30) calls it, the hero among beasts. But if it be dead, then all is over with its dignity and its strength; the existence of a living dog is to be preferred to that of the dead lion. The art. in 'הא הם is not that denoting species (Dale), which is excluded by hammēth, but it points to the carcase of a lion which is present. The author, who elsewhere prefers death and nonentity to life, Ecc 4:2., Ecc 7:1, appears to have fallen into contradiction with himself; but there he views life pessimistically in its, for the most part, unhappy experiences, while here he regards it in itself as a good affording the possibility of enjoyment. It lies, however, in the nature of his standpoint that he should not be able to find the right medium between the sorrow of the world and the pleasure of life. Although postulating a retribution in eternity, yet in his thoughts about the future he does not rise above the comfortless idea of Hades. Ecclesiastes 9:5